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Today, you have reached a major goal in your quest for formal higher 
education. For many of you, this wil l be the end of that formal process as 
you leave here to assume a new, contributory role in society. Others will 
continue in the process to seek higher degrees, and indeed may become a part 
of the educational system itself. 
As you enjoy the flush of achievement, i t may seem a bit strange to 
you that I want to address my brief remarks on this occasion to a rather 
somber subject - - the cost and financing of education. Indeed, you may think 
me something of a spoilsport for introducing such a serious note into this 
festive day. 
* This is the second in a series of discussions on the financing of higher 
education. The f i rst was "Higher Education: Who Benefits? Who Pays?" 
given as the commencement address at Oakland University, June 5, 1971. 
But those who have had the opportunity to obtain a higher education 
have a special responsibility to sustain and promote higher education in the 
future. The cost of education is something that you and your parents have 
lived with for a number of years. Graduation does not necessarily end the 
concern. For many of you, the joy of graduation is tempered by the knowledge 
that the next day begins the long and arduous process of repaying the 
accumulated debt which helped pay for your degree. However, regardless of 
whether or not you are indebted, as contributing members of society as 
parents and taxpayers - - the developing crisis in financing higher education 
i 
becomes part of your responsibility. 
The crisis is ironic, for the pressures to reduce the public 
commitment to support higher education come at a time in history when our 
society and economy have reached a level of complexity which makes a highly-
educated citizenry indispensable. 
Let us look at some of the factors which contribute to the pressures 
that affect public support. 
~ Campus discontent, which leads many taxpayers and legislators to 
feel that those whom they are supporting show a singular lack of 
appreciation. 
- - Unemployed college graduates whose presence, despite their degrees, 
raise questions as to the validity of their education and the 
planning which produced them for a non-existent job market. 
- - Greater demand on tax revenues for other social purposes, which 
leaves less for higher education. 
- - New pressures on the family budget, caused by inflation, higher 
taxes, and unemployment. 
- - Rapidly increasing costs of higher education, resulting from 
inflation, expansion and the complexities of new curricula. 
Of course, this last point - - the increasing costs of higher education 
closes the circle and reinforces the growing reluctance to provide greater 
public support. 
Recent studies show that the costs of a university education have 
been increasing at an average annual rate of about 15 percent per year. -
Even more alarming has been the persistent trend toward shifting a larger 
and larger share of the costs of an education to the student. 
Educational loans and similar repayment plans are a permanent 
feature of the academic scene and one which is hardly l ikely to disappear. 
There is a particular type of loan which is attracting a great deal of 
attention across the nation which is usually called "income contingency" 
2/ 
loans or humorously described as "study now, pay more l a te r . " - In my 
brief remarks today, I would l ike to share with you my views,as an 
economist,about some potentially very undesirable consequences of such 
loans. 
V Ernest Becker, "The Financing of Higher Education: A review of historical 
Trends and Projections for 1975-76," Trends in Post Secondary Education, 
(Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, October 1970) p. 99 
2/ I realize that one such proposal has been introduced by the Governor of 
Ohio and must apologize in advance lest I be chastised for poor form at 
expressing cr i t ical remarks of one's host. Let me assure you that my 
comments are basically directed at the genus "income contingency loan" 
plans rather than any specific plan and that my essential objection is 
not with the goal but with the means. 
In the past twenty years, there have been drastic changes in the 
policies which guide the disbursement of scholarships and financial aid to 
students. There has been a growing recognition that financial barriers have 
prevented or inhibited a large number of talented and able youths from 
attaining a higher education. This awareness has resulted in scholarship 
and financial-aid policies based primarily upon economic need rather than 
solely upon academic accomplishment. This change in aid policy has 
significantly expanded the opportunities for economically disadvantaged 
students to benefit from our colleges and universities, in a fashion 
unparalleled since the GI Bi l l after World War II. We have witnessed an 
important shift in national policy reducing the financial barriers to college 
or university attendance. More and more high school graduates with proven 
academic potential and the motivation are now able to attend an institution 
of higher education regardless of their economic status. 
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Unfortunately these efforts to remove the financial barriers 
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to attendance at higher educational institutions have coincided with the 
growing financial stresses being experienced by both private and public 
colleges and universities. Consequently, these serious financial 
dif f icult ies are compounding attempts to eliminate financial obstacles 
faced by needy but worthy students. Faced with the prospect of 
ever-tightening financial stringency, many universities and state 
administrations have urgently sought new remedies for the fiscal i l l s 
which beset them. 
3/ The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education recently issued a study 
which revealed that 540 public and private institutions, including 
a third of al l U.S. universities are in serious financial diff iculty. 
An additional 1,000 institutions were said to be headed toward 
serious financial difficulty in the near future. 
Earl Cheit, The New Depression, in Higher Education: A Study of  
Financial Conditions at 41 Colleges and Universities (New York: 
McGraw H i l l , 1971). 
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Among the various panaceas is a controversial set of proposals which 
are best described generically as income contingency loan plans. The basic 
features of most income contingency loan plans are fair ly similar. Under such 
plans, a student while enrolled at a college or university receives a loan 
toward the expenses of his education which he promises to repay after completing 
his study on the basis of some fixed percentage of his annual income. 
4/ The three which have received the greatest attention are the Ford Foundation 
"PAYE" plan, Yale University's "Tuition Postponement" program, and the 
recently announced proposal for the State of Ohio. 
The Yale plan assumes that the total amount lent wil l be repaid at interest 
the same as would be true of a conventional loan plan. The rate of interest 
to be returned on any amount loaned wil l be determined by the interest which 
Yale pays in the market when i t borrows the funds. The difference from 
conventional loans is that the repayment obligation is pooled and tied to 
the level of income of the individual members of a particular pool. All 
students participating in the plan who graduate in a particular year 
would make up an independent pool. Participants obligate themselves to 
repay .4 percent of their gross adjusted income for each $1,000 borrowed, 
payments to continue until the fund is repaid at interest. The number of 
yearly payments required wil l depend upon the total income of the parti-
cipants in the pool. No payments are expected after 35 years and at 
current levels of income the repayment would probably be considerably less. 
Under the Ohio plan, every student entering a state university would be 
required to sign an agreement to repay the state subsidy for his education. 
The Ohio plan includes some subsidy from the state, for i t is not expected 
to receive al l of the state subsidy back at compounded interest. Private 
schools could join the plan, receive funds from the state, and their 
students would assume the same obligations to repay the state subsidy as 
i f they had attended a public school. The plan is designed to reduce 
the state's contribution to higher education. The proposal effectively 
eliminates the distinction between public and private schools, as far as 
direct educational services are concerned. 
For an excellent review of earlier proposals such as the National Student 
Loan Bank, the Educational Opportunity Bank, and the Carnegie Commission 
Bank, see Robert W. Hartman, Credit for College, Public Policy for Student 
Loans, {Carnegie Commission) (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971) esp. Chapter 6. 
8. 
The logic of these plans is clear; i t goes something like this. 
Students benefit from a college education as shown by higher average lifetime 
earnings of the college educated. The student should therefore pay for this 
economic benefit. However, many students lack the resources to finance an 
expensive education. The solution then is to improve the capital market, 
that i s , loans should be made available so that no student would be barred 
from college due to an inability to finance i t . However, potential students 
from poor families may not be willing to borrow the amount needed to finance 
an expensive education. The amount of the loan looks large compared to 
family income and i t is not certain that a college education would produce 
enough extra income to make i t pay. The answer is a loan to be paid back on 
the basis of a percentage of earnings. This reduces the risk and uncertainty 
and every youngster who can benefit from an education has the chance to get 
one. This brings new money to the hard-pressed educational institutions and 
relieves the reluctant legislatures of the problem of raising taxes to support 
higher education. 
The proposal sounds good. So why would a university president take 
the time in a commencement address to question it? 
I have several serious objections to these schemes - - let me cite two: 
9. 
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1. Divergence Between Public and Private Benefit 
First , such plans will accentuate the already alarming pressures 
against public support for higher education. These plans must be seen as 
part of an underlying and growing trend toward a greater and greater burden 
of the costs of education being borne by the student. This trend f l ies in 
the face of this nation's longstanding policy of public support of education. 
Deciding "who pays" for higher education should be based upon 
"who benefits." The basic rationale for public support of education lies 
in the fact that the person receiving an education does not reap al l the 
rewards; society gains as well. In economist's terms, the social benefits 
exceed the private benefits. Among the social benefits of education are 
those which enhance the individual's capacities to contribute to the 
community as a cit izen, and those which contribute to increased productivity 
of the economy. 
C 
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We thus have in the case of higher education two very distinct 
situations in which the social benefits exceed the private benefits. First, 
there is the fact that society gains from an education something more than 
the individual is able to capture in income. Second, the university 
contributes to society both in training high level manpower and in generating 
new knowledge plus public service ventures, but the institution or people in 
i t rarely capture any of the benefits of these activities as a financial 
reward. Thus, there are substantial social benefits from both sources in 
excess of private benefits. 
The fundamental danger with income contingency loan plans is that 
they are contributing further to the trend toward students and their families 
bearing a greater and greater share of the total costs of an education - - a 
trend premised upon the erroneous assumption that i t is the student solely 
who benefits from the multifaceted activities of a university. Everyone 
agrees that a student should pay a fair share of the costs of his education, 
i 
even though disagreements are likely over what constitutues a "fair share." 
n . 
What is objectionable is the continuing shift from public support toward 
greater private support - - toward a greater burden being born by the 
student and his family. Income contingency loan plans in their present 
form are a strong contributing element to this trend. 
Many persons who support experimentation with such loan programs 
advocate this approach as an additional source of funds, not as a substitute 
for community support for higher education. However, the political realities 
must be considered; pressure is growing to reduce public support and 
responsibility for higher education. There are many who believe i t desirable 
to replace direct public support of institutions of higher education by 
either student loans or public grants to students - - or both. I am deeply 
concerned that these socially mischievous beliefs wil l be reinforced by 
the promotion of the income contingency loan concept. 
12. 
Despite pious protestations to the contrary, the income contingency 
loan idea constitutes a definite shift away from public decisions and 
responsibility for the support and control of higher education toward a 
philosophy of private responsibility and private enterprise — with major 
consequences. Most important, the shift would transform the goals, values, 
and conduct of the entire higher educational system. It would change the 
character of private schools as well as the public ones.- It wi l l have 
profound effects on investments in higher education. And i t wi l l also 
have important socio-political implications for equity and justice. 
5/ I do not believe the public versus private school issue can or should 
be avoided in this discussion. I am convinced that private universities 
are essential to our educational system and that they are highly 
complementary to public institutions. I am interested in high quality 
private education as well as high quality public education. But in 
fairness i t should be pointed out that the high quality private 
universities have never been financed entirely by student fees. Private 
universities have not been public in the traditional sense, but in a 
broader sense they have been community supported institutions because 
their support has come largely through tax-exempt contributions. These 
exemptions were agreed to by the public and thus the resources which 
flow to the private universities have been the result of a public 
decision, even though the choice of a particular institution is private. 
6/ The impact of a higher degree of "student consumerism" upon the allocation 
of educational resources is l ikely to be extensive. Because the private 
benefits and the social benefits from education diverge, a student's 
rational economic decisions wil l reflect only his calculus not that of 
society. These and related implications wil l be examined further on 
another occasion. 
13. 
2. Equal Access and Selectivity 
One of the most frequently mentioned arguments in favor of income 
contingency loan plans is their attractiveness in aiding the economically 
disadvantaged student to secure a college education. Superficially, these 
proposals would appear to be ideally suited to the needs of low-income youth. 
But a more careful analysis of these proposals reveals that they are more 
l ikely to discourage such youth from attending college. 
A basic argument in favor of the income contingency loan approach 
is that potential students from lower-income families see a conventional 
debt as a formidable obligation - - and as a result judge the investment in 
higher education as unreasonable or unattainable. A young man {and his 
parents) from a family with a $5,000 per year income would view a $5,000 
debt required to acquire an education as a more significant problem than 
a young man from a family with a $35,000 per year income. It is further argued 
that repayment of a loan based upon actual income earned rather than a straight 
interest loan would appear less risky and diff icult to the lower-income youth. 
However, an empirical question remains as to whether in fact significantly 
larger numbers of potential students from low-income families would borrow 
14. 
under such plans than would uti l ize conventional loans. Even though such a 
loan might require an annual payment of only two percent of gross adjusted 
income, the repayment would be stretched over 35 years and might be perceived 
as a poor investment by a low-income youth.— 
7/ For example, under the Yale plan, a student entering in the Fal l , 1971, 
could defer $800. In subsequent years he could postpone any additional 
charges to an anticipated total of $5,000. Since the current role of 
repayment is .4 percent per $1,000 borrowed, a student entering in the 
Fal l , 1971, and graduating in 1976 could incur a maximum charge of 
2 percent of his annual income for 35 years. However, keep in mind 
that such a loan wil l not cover all costs. Students from very low 
income families will generally require funds to meet a major share of 
living expenses as well as to pay tuition. An obligation of this 
magnitude would certainly discourage many potential students. 
Another important issue is the "pooling effect" under which a student 
borrower joins a particular pool of graduates and whose aggregate earnings 
and repayment records affect his debt obligation. For example, as I 
understand the Yale proposal, the .4 percent repayment is based upon the 
relatively high $35,000 average annual income of Yale graduates. A pool 
of students with much lower expected incomes would have to carry a higher 
rate. 
Thus, two students with the same incomes over the 35 years after graduation 
might pay significantly different amounts for the same loans, depending 
on the average earnings of the group in their pool. However, the variation 
in payments is limited in the Yale plan by the option to buy out at 
150 percent of the loan at compounded interest. Thus, those in the pool 
who have earnings causing their obligations to exceed this buy-out level 
would have an incentive to buy out. Even the University would have an 
incentive to encourage the financially successful participants to buy 
out of the plan and to contribute the excess to the university rather 
than using i t to reduce the obligations of the remaining members of the pool. 
What then would be the effect of a national system in which each college 
was financed by similar plans, each college with a separate pool? Two 
students with the same incomes attending different colleges could pay 
very different rates due to the difference in average income of the 
participants in the pool. A student attending a teacher's college, for 
example, could expect to pay a much higher rate of his income than a student 
attending Yale. This would introduce a new and undesirable incentive in 
selecting schools. It also emphasizes the tax aspect of the income 
contingency loan approach and the inequity of the repayment associated 
with the selectivity of the pool. A multi-institutional pool would, by 
contrast, have the disadvantage of discouraging participation on a 
selective basis. It would turn out to be even more inequitable for those 
forced by need and circumstance into the loan and payment pool. 
15. 
The most important equity question relates to the possible 
selectiveness of the participants in any such plan. Those expecting 
i 
above average earnings (viz., medicine) who had access to conventional 
loans or other funding would probably not participate. Hence, plan 
participation would tend to be concentrated among those with lower income. 
A student from a middle-income or wealthy family who expects to earn a 
high income during his productive years would prefer either to have his 
family pay for his education or to secure a traditional loan with interest. 
Under either arrangement, the total cost of his education would be a 
smaller fraction of his total expected income than under an income 
contingency plan. Thus, those students who are l ikely to be involved 
in income contingency loan plans are those from low-income and low-middle 
income families — exactly those elements in our society who can afford 
these costs the least. Thus, in any income contingency loan plan, there 
wil l be an automatic selectivity which wil l limit participation largely to 
the low-income student — a regressivity directly contrary to stated public 
policy. Li t t le wonder that there are those who call income contingency loans 
a plan for "lifelong indenture." 
16. 
Another important problem to consider in this context is the very 
low participation in higher education by low-income members of minority 
groups in the United States. In situations where there is l i t t l e cultural 
pressure to seek a higher education and a general aversion to accepting 
long-term obligations, a 35-year loan, even on an income contingency basis 
is certain to be perceived as a major barrier to higher education. These 
young people need much more financial aid than merely tuition costs so 
they are l ikely to face correspondingly larger debt obligations. 
It is particularly ironic that at the very moment when we are 
opening access to higher education for the economically disadvantaged 
segments of our society, we are simultaneously placing a greater cost 
burden on students. In the present case, we are shifting the burden to 
those very segments of society which can afford to bear i t the least. 
At the very moment when society is beginning to recognize the greater 
societal benefits from a dollar spent on the educational improvement of 
the economically and educationally disadvantaged - - compared with the 
benefits from a similar dollar spent on welfare - - we chose to increase 
the financial burden borne by students from such backgrounds who decide 
17. 
to seek higher education. We piously announce that we wil l provide broader 
access to higher education while at the same time we prepare to reduce the 
level of subsidy for this new generation of students. 
Let me pause here for a moment and offer a word of caution. Far 
too frequently the issue of differential impact upon disadvantaged students 
is seen from a limited ethnic or racial perspective. So much publicity and 
attention has been given to special programs for Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto 
Ricans and American Indians that the public often acquires the erroneous 
impression that the bulk of such funds and financial aid are directed to 
these groups. The facts of the matter are quite the reverse. For example, 
in the 1967-68 academic year, the number of Blacks who benefited from Federal 
financial-aid programs totalled 94,278, while 574,229 whites received such 
8/ 
aid. While a larger percentage of all full-time Black students received 
such aid (about one-third) compared with whites (roughly 13 percent), the 
overwhelming total numbers of students who benefited were not the ethnic 
minorities but whites. Because the e l ig ib i l i ty requirements for these programs 
8/ W. Lee Hansen, "An Examination of Barriers to College Attendance," 
Trends in Post Secondary Education, (Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, Washington, D. C : U~. S. Government Printing Office, 
October 1970) p. 49, Table 21. 
18. 
are based upon parental income, the majority of the funds go to 
low-income students, and the vast majority of the needy students in colleges 
and universities are white, not Black, Brown or Red. 
I stress this point of fact because the issues which I have outlined 
related to income contingency plans are likely to affect all_ students from 
low-income families, not merely those from minority groups. While i t may 
be true that proportionately the impact will be greater among the minorities 
because a larger fraction of them continue to be poor; in absolute numbers, 
i t is the whites who are the largest. Thus, the proposals advanced to 
facil i tate university attendance by the economically disadvantaged of our 
nation should not be viewed from a parochial ethnic perspective but from a 
national one. 
There are a number of additional criticisms which might be made, 
such as the forcing of universities into a tax-collector role for which they 
are i l l -sui ted. The Federal Government is already experiencing sizeable 
problems over i ts uncollected and uncollectable student loans. If the 
Federal Government is having dif f iculty, what success is a university 
l ikely to have? 
19. 
Finally, we need to be reminded that our adoption of the progressive 
income tax many years ago already captures much, i f not a l l , of the cost of 
educational subsidy implicit in the institutional funding approach. Such a 
tax philosophy recognizes the need for redistributive equity via governmental 
expenditures in support of education. If this already exists, why introduce 
such a burden a second time? 
Some Alternatives 
As is undoubtedly obvious by now, I do not believe the present versions 
of income contingency loans offer an economically or socially sound basis for 
meeting the increased costs of higher education in the United States. But 
the problem remains. What alternatives do we have? I do not see any simple 
solutions. 
Given our limited understanding of the economics of the system of 
higher education in the United States, we need careful and comprehensive 
analysis of the consequences of alternative patterns of financing of higher 
education. A narrow focus on income contingency plans is not only undesirable 
but dangerous. 
9/ Two excellent recent reviews are Robert W. Hartman, Credit for College, 
Public Policy for Student Loans (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1971) and 
Joseph D. Boyd, "An Examination of State Efforts to Remove Financial 
Barriers to Post-Secondary Education," Trends in Post-Secondary Education, 
(Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, October 1970). 
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Further, I believe the financial problem will become more acute 
in the future. Education is essentially a service - - a service which is 
performed by people who generally have good economic alternatives. The 
application of technology and industrial processes is relatively more 
effective in increasing productivity and thus reducing costs in the 
production of goods as contrasted to services. While I am confident that 
the productivity of educational activities will be improved, I am equally 
convinced that changes in the nature and quality of the educational product 
required and demanded will more than consume any productivity gains. 
Because knowledge is cumulative, the product of education is 
continuously changing also. However, the cost of a year of instruction can 
be expected to increase substantially relative to the costs of goods and 
services in general. This is an economic fact of l i fe and must be recognized 
in planning an economic policy for education. Because I believe both the cost 
of education and the social need for education will increase, I am reluctant 
to accept any proposal which might undermine public education in the 
United States. 
21. 
Based upon my current understanding of the economics of the United 
States' system of higher education, I would propose some important 
I 
modifications in the financing pattern but not a radical departure from the 
idea that higher education should be financed from a variety of sources. 
I believe the pluralistic system of higher education is a good one and that 
the combination of public and private support is needed to support the 
pluralistic system. 
I would argue that a very considerable increase in funding from the 
Federal tax system would be desirable and economically sound. This is 
consistent with my belief that a very substantial social benefit accrues 
from the investment in higher education at both public and private institutions. 
For a number of reasons most states seem to be unable or unwilling to provide 
the needed funds. College graduates are highly mobile, perhaps leading to 
the conclusion that the taxpayers of an individual state get a limited return 
from investing in higher education. Rather than an unrestricted program of 
Federal revenue sharing, I would propose the Federal Government assume 
responsibility to provide foundation levels of funds in some specific 
10/ 
program areas.— 
1Q/ The various proposals for institutional support currently being considered 
by Congress are an important, though modest, step in the right direction. 
22. 
Conclusion 
In summary, I believe the best allocation of resources to education 
i • 
and the best use of resources by the system will result from a policy of 
public support for higher education. With support for the direct educational 
expenses in the form of institutional grants, with additional financial aid 
and work opportunities available, such a policy will help assure that every 
student capable of benefiting from higher education wil l have the opportunity 
and incentive to continue his or her education. Income contingency loan plans 
may offer temporary help to some individual universities — though I remain 
skeptical. Certainly such a plan does not offer a significant advantage over 
conventional loans, and certainly they are not the best answer to the crit ical 
general problem of financing U. S. higher education. 
If the greatest number are to be served and served effectively by our 
higher educational systems and in turn benefit society in the years ahead, we 
cannot and must not withdraw from this nation's historic public commitment to 
support public education. 
At this particular point in history, any withdrawal might well 
undermine the future of higher education in this country. 
